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ABSTRACT 
MANETs are self configuring networks that are formed by a set of wireless mobile 
nodes and have no fixed network infrastructure nor administrative support. Since 
transmission range of wireless network interfaces is limited, forwarding hosts may 
be needed. Each node in a wireless ad hoc network functions is as both a host and a 
router. Due to their communication type and resources constraint, MANETs are 
vulnerable to diverse types of attacks and intrusions so, security is a critical issue. 
Network security is usually provided in the three phases: intrusion prevention, 
intrusion detection and intrusion tolerance phase. However, the network security 
problem is far from completely solved. Researchers have been exploring the 
applicability of game theory approaches to address the network security issues. This 
paper reviews some existing game theory solutions which are designed to enhance 
network security in the intrusion detection phase. 
Keywords: Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET), Intrusion detection system (IDS), 
Cluster head, host based, Game theory. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is one of the wireless networks that have 
attracted most concentrations from many researchers. In general, MANETs are 
formed dynamically by an autonomous system of mobile nodes that are connected 
via wireless links without using an existing network infrastructure or centralized 
administration. [1]. Nodes can directly communicate with all the other nodes within 
their radio ranges, whereas nodes are not in the direct communication range. They 
use intermediate node(s) to communicate with each other, this is known as multi-
hop communication. Each node operates in distributed peer-to-peer mode and acts as 
an independent router, and generates independent data. No dedicated routers are 
necessary, every node acts as a router and forwards each other’s packets to enable 
information sharing between mobile hosts [2].  
The main advantages of MANET are flexibility, adaptability, easy collaboration 
and efficient communication in infrastructure-less environments. Because of the 
special advantages that wireless ad hoc networks present, their applications vary 
from battlefield scenarios to recovery operations in case of disasters, such as in 
hurricanes, floods and terrorist acts. Although MANETs presents many advantages, 
they also present a number of inherent vulnerabilities that increase their security 
risks. Due to the open access medium, the dynamically changing topology, the lack 
of a centralized monitoring and management point, the limited resources and the 
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lack of physical security of the member MANETs are often subject to types of 
attacks and intrusions [3]. Also the MANET has the following typical features [4]: 
Unreliability of wireless links between nodes. Because of the limited energy 
supply for the wireless nodes and the mobility of the nodes, the wireless links 
between mobile nodes in the ad hoc network are not consistent for the 
communication participants. 
Changing topology. Due to the continuous motion of nodes, the topology of the 
mobile ad hoc network changes constantly. the nodes can continuously move into 
and out of the radio range of the other nodes in the ad hoc network, and the routing 
information will be changing all the time because of the movement of the nodes. 
Due to above features, MANETs are more susceptible to the variety intrusions. 
Therefore, the security issue should be considered. Many solutions have been 
proposed for security problems for ad hoc networks [2]. In general, there are three 
defence lines to provide security such as prevention, detection and tolerance of 
intrusion mechanisms. Essentially, these solutions use specialized hardware, 
cryptographic primitives, mechanisms for overhearing neighbor communication or 
protocols designed for path diversity. In recent years researchers proposed several 
methods to improve security in the three defence lines by applying various 
approaches such as statically methods, neural networks, data mining, genetic 
algorithm, game theory and etc. In this paper we focus on intrusion detection 
mechanism and investigate proposed game theory approaches to enhance security 
and capability of intrusion detection mechanisms. The remainder of the paper is 
structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the security requirements 
specially intrusion detection. Section 3 briefly describes game theory. There are 
many methods about using game theory approaches in the field of intrusion 
detection. In section 4 is investigated some game theory approaches to improve 
performance of intrusion detection in MANET, and section 5 constitutes 
conclusions. 
 
 
2. INTRUSION DETECTION 
 
Intrusion detection can be defined as a process of monitoring activities in a 
system which can be a computer or a network. The mechanism that performs this 
task is called an intrusion detection system (IDS). Intrusion detection can be used as 
a second line of defense to secure the network. So, IDS should analyze system 
activities and it ensures whether or not an intrusion has occurred [5]. If the intrusion 
is detected, a response can be initiated to prevent or minimize damage to the system. 
Intrusion detection system can be classified based on various criteria such as audit 
data, the detection methods and IDS architecture. Intrusion detection system based 
on audit data source categorized in host based and network based. A network-based 
IDS captures and analyzes packets from network traffic while a host-based IDS uses 
operating system or application logs in its analysis. IDSs fall into two categories 
according to the detection methods they employ, misuse / signature detection, 
anomaly detection and specification detection. Misuse detection identifies intrusions 
by matching observed data with predefined descriptions of intrusive behavior. 
Therefore, well-known intrusions can be detected efficiently with a very low false 
alarm rate. However, intrusions are usually polymorph, and evolve continuously. 
Misuse detection will fail easily when facing unknown intrusions. While Anomaly 
detection is defined as the process of comparing definitions of activity that is 
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considered normal against observed events in order to identify significant 
deviations. Moreover, an anomaly in a dataset is defined as an observation that 
appears to be inconsistent with the remainder of the dataset [6]. There are two types 
of anomaly detection. The first is static anomaly detection, which assumes that the 
behavior of monitored targets never changes, such as system call sequences of an 
Apache service. The second type is dynamic anomaly detection which extracts 
patterns from behavioral habits of end users, or usage history of networks/hosts [7]. 
Sometimes these patterns are called profiles. Clearly, anomaly detection has the 
capability of detecting new types of intrusions, and only requires normal data when 
building profiles. However, its major difficulty lies in discovering boundaries 
between normal and abnormal behavior, due to the deficiency of abnormal samples 
in the training phase. Another difficulty is to adapt to constantly changing normal 
behavior, especially for dynamic anomaly detection. Specification-based detection 
defines a set of constraints that describe the correct operation of a program or 
protocol. Then, it monitors the execution of the program with respect to the defined 
constraints.  
The third classification of IDS criteria is IDS architecture. The MANET can be 
configured to either flat or hierarchical infrastructure. The optimal IDS architecture 
for the MANET depend on the network infrastructure itself. There are four main 
IDS architectures on the network , as follows: 1) Standalone IDS, 2) Distributed and 
Collaborative IDS, 3) Hierarchical IDS, 4) Mobile Agent for Intrusion Detection 
Systems [8]. The classification of the intrusion detection illustrates in figure 1. 
 
3. GAME THEORY 
Game theory [10] is a discipline aiming to model situations in which decision 
makers have to make specific actions that have mutual possibly conflicting 
consequences. Game theory is concerned with finding the best actions for individual 
decision makers in such situations and recognizing stable outcomes. It has been used 
primarily in economics, in order to model competition between companies. 
It is a powerful tool in that it can be used to model any system which exhibits the 
characteristics of a game. In the recent years game theory has been extensively used 
in the most fields such as economic, computer, network communication, biology, 
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political science and etc. Game theory usually considers a multi-player decision 
problem where multiple players with different objectives can compete and interact 
with each other. A game consists of a set of players a set of moves (or strategy) 
available to those players, and a specification of payoffs for each combination of 
strategies. A player's strategy is a plan for actions in each possible situation in the 
game. A player's payoff is the amount that the player wins or loses in a particular 
situation in a game. A player has a dominant strategy if that player's best strategy 
does not depend on what other players do [11]. The equilibrium strategies are 
chosen by the players in order to maximize their individual payoffs. In game theory, 
the Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of a game involving two or more players, 
in which no player has anything to gain by changing only his own strategy 
unilaterally. If each player has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by 
changing his strategy while the other players keep their unchanged, then the current 
set of strategy choices and the corresponding payoffs constitute a Nash equilibrium. 
Some games can be solved by iterated dominance, which systematically rules out 
strategy profiles. On the other hand  When a player makes a decision, he can use 
either a pure or a mixed strategy. If the actions of the player are deterministic, he is 
considered using a pure strategy. If probability distributions are defined to describe 
the actions of the player, a mixed strategy is used [13].  
Game theory classifies games into two categories: non-cooperative and 
cooperative. Non-cooperative games are games with two or more players that are 
competing with each other. Cooperative games are games with multi-players 
cooperating with each other in order to achieve the greatest possible total benefits. 
Also can be classified as games of complete information, incomplete information, 
based on whether the players have complete or incomplete information about their 
adversaries in the game. In contrast, cooperative game theory abstracts away from 
this level of detail and describes only the outcomes that result when the players 
come together in different combinations [12]. 
Ad hoc network can be model to a game. In a game, players are independent 
decision makers whose payoffs depend on other players actions. Also Nodes in an 
ad hoc network are characterized by the same feature. This similarity leads to a 
strong mapping between traditional game theory components and elements of an ad 
hoc network. 
 
 
3.1  BENEFITS OF APPLYING GAME THEORY TO AD HOC 
NETWORKS 
 
Game theory offers certain benefits as a tool to analyze distributed algorithms and 
protocols for ad hoc networks. Thus  here is introduced highlight three of these 
benefits: 
Analysis of distributed systems: Game theory allows us to investigate the existence, 
uniqueness and convergence to a steady state operating point when network nodes 
perform independent adaptations. Hence it serves as a strong tool for a rigorous 
analysis of distributed protocols. 
Cross layer optimization: Often in ad hoc networking  games, node decisions at a 
particular layer are made with the objective of optimizing performance at some of 
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the other layers. With an appropriate formulation of the action space, game theoretic 
analysis can provide insight into approaches for cross layer optimization. 
Design of incentive schemes: Mechanism design is an area of game theory that 
concerns itself with how to engineer incentive mechanisms that will lead 
independent, self-interested participants towards outcomes that are desirable from a  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
system-wide point of view. This may prove especially helpful in the design of 
incentive schemes for ad hoc networks. 
A game theory platform is suitable for modeling security issues such as intrusion 
prevention and intrusion detection. There are many researches on applying game 
theory in intrusion detection systems. In this paper we investigate some of these 
studies about capability of game theory approaches to enhance performance of IDS. 
 
 
4.   APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY IN INTRUSION DETECTION FOR 
MANET 
 
In this section are reviewed and investigated some existing game theory  
approaches in various branches of intrusion detection for MANET. First we present 
overview of game theory approaches in branch of IDS which illustrate in figure 2. 
Then introduce and survey these game models, their goal and performance. 
However, each of them improve the efficiency of intrusion detection in different 
ways. 
 
4.1 HOST BASED IDS BY APPLYING GAME THEORY : 
Researchers proposed different game model that consider various parameter to 
increase performance of IDS for this branch of intrusion detection system.  
Patcha and Park [14] designed a host based IDS using dynamic non-cooperative 
game with incomplete information. They model the interactions between the nodes 
of an ad-hoc network as a basic signaling game which falls under the gambit of 
multi-stage dynamic non-cooperative game with incomplete information. They offer 
optimal strategy for host based IDS and either intruder. The intrusion detection 
game is played between an attacker and IDS. The objective of the attacker is to send 
a malicious message from some attack node, with the intension of attacking the 
target node. The intrusion is deemed successful when the malicious message reaches 
the target machine without being detected by the host IDS. They assume that an 
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intrusion is detected and the intruding node is blocked when a message sent by a 
probable intruder is intercepted and the host IDS can say with certainty that the 
message is malicious in nature. In their model, the cost associated with an 
undetected intrusion to be much more severe than the cost associated with false 
alarms. In their proposed signaling game model, a node is the sender and a host 
based IDS is the receiver to which the message is directed. The sender node is 
assumed to be one of the 2 type’s regular node or malicious node/attacker. The 
strategy of the IDS is picking the optimal strategy out of its available set to response  
a message which is coming from the sending node. The choice of strategy is based 
on the receiver’s prior beliefs, such that it is able to maximize the effective payoff 
by minimizing the cost due to false alarms and missed attacks. As long as they 
believed their model is theoretically consistent and this game-theory modeling 
technique models intrusion detection in a more realistic way compared to previous 
approaches.  
Liu et al [15]. Proposed a game theory framework to analyze the interactions 
between pairs of attacker/defending (is equipped with an IDS) nodes using a 
Bayesian formulation. Although they considered resource and energy limitation in 
MANET. They study the achievable Nash equilibrium for the attacker/host based 
IDS game in both static and dynamic scenarios. The dynamic Bayesian game is a 
more realistic model, since it allows the IDS to consistently update his belief on his 
opponent’s maliciousness as the game evolves. A new Bayesian hybrid detection 
approach is suggested for the IDS, in which a lightweight monitoring system is used 
to estimate his opponent’s actions, and a heavyweight monitoring system acts as a 
last resort of defense. They show that the dynamic game produces energy-efficient 
monitoring strategies for the defender, while improving the overall hybrid detection 
power. 
In the static game model Considered a flat ad hoc network with a fixed number of 
N nodes in the network and apply host based IDS due to they assumed that any 
defending node is equipped with an IDS. Depending on the capability of the IDS, 
the defending node can detect an attacking node in the neighborhood or any node in 
the network. In Static mode Considered a two-player static Bayesian game. One 
player is a potential attacking node, it can be malicious or normal that has private 
information about its type. Another player is defending node (IDS). The type of 
defender  is common knowledge to the two players. The malicious type of player 
has two pure strategies: Attack and Not attack. The normal type of player has one 
pure strategy: Not attack. Defender has two pure strategies: Monitor and Not 
monitor. The two players choose their strategies simultaneously at the beginning of 
the game, assuming common knowledge about the game (costs and beliefs). This 
static non cooperative game has Bayesian Nash Equilibrium solution(BNE)[15]. 
Authors represent  The advantage of using a static Bayesian game model instead of 
applying an always-on IDS monitoring strategy is , the defender can implement an 
efficient monitoring strategy according to his BNE solution that maximizes his 
expected payoff.  
In the dynamic game model they extend the static Bayesian game to a multi-stage 
dynamic Bayesian game, where the defender updates his beliefs according to the 
game evolution. So they assume that the static Bayesian game is repeatedly played 
in each time period tk, where k = 0, 1, .... An interval of T seconds may be selected 
for each stage game. They consider that the game has an infinite horizon because in 
general any node will not have the information about when his neighboring node 
leaves the network. The payoff of the players in each stage game are the same as in 
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the preceding static game, and we assume that there is no discount factor with 
respect to the payoffs of the players. They shown that the dynamic game  has a 
mixed-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium solution . 
Finally Liu et al have shown that the equilibrium strategies can preserve energy 
expenditure, and improve the performance of the hybrid detection approach. Also 
have shown that, while the equilibrium depends on the malicious node’s 
knowledge on the defender
,
s utility for different actions, and depends on what he 
thinks about the defender
,
s updated belief, it is fairly robust to the malicious node
,
s 
imperfect knowledge on the performance of the defender
,
s lightweight monitoring 
system. 
Marchang and Tripathi [16] presented a game theory model for efficient 
deployment of intrusion detection systems (IDSs) in MANETs. They declare that 
most of the existing intrusion detection systems in MANETs, a detection system sits 
on every node which runs all the time. So, there is a costly overhead for a battery 
powered mobile device. They have used game theory to model the interactions 
between the intrusion detection system and the attacker to determine whether it is 
essential to always keep the IDS running without compromising on its effectiveness. 
In this game model, an IDS attempts to detect intrusion from an attacker; hence, they 
may look at this as a game between two players, the IDS and the attacker. The 
attacker’s intent is to attack the network without getting caught, whereas that of the 
IDS is to detect when the attacker attacks. So, the model is constructed for a two-
player non-cooperative non-zero sum game. The assumptions are: an IDS sits at 
every node and monitors some data to detect intrusion and need not be running on 
the node 100% of the time during which the MANET is up. The strategy profile for 
both the players consists of two strategies. Hence, the pure strategy space of the IDS 
is: monitor t% time, no monitor. Thus, the pure strategy space of the attacker is: 
attack s% time, not attack. The authors were considered both perfect and imperfect 
IDS. So, they established two game models, first, the game between perfect IDS and 
attacker then imperfect IDS and attacker. The game solution for both is a Nash 
equilibrium mixed strategy pair, where neither player has unilateral incentive to 
change its strategy. There are game models detail and players payoff table in [16] 
The results of their analysis show that one does not need to keep an IDS running all 
the time while maintaining its effectiveness. They claim the analysis  helps in 
determining the optimal defense strategies that the network administrator must 
deploy. In this section we review three studies in intrusion detection field by using 
game theory approaches in host based IDS . 
 
 
4.2   ANOMALY DETECTION BY APPLYING GAME THEORY 
 
 In this section we investigate a method about this area .  
Agah etal [17]. introduced a game theory based scheme for finding out the 
vulnerable areas in a WSN, based on many risk factors such as reliability of a sensor 
node, different types of attack, and past behaviors of the attacker. Only these 
identified areas are provided with the protection of detection, In order to save the 
energy cost. Intrusion detection is modeled as a game played between detection 
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system and adversary. Each player is allowed to select a strategy from a set of 
strategies once. Given a fixed cluster in the network, say K, these strategies are 
available to adversary: attack cluster K, not attack cluster K, and attack a different 
cluster. Detection system responds to either defend cluster K, or defend a different 
cluster. The strategies a remarked with1 to 3 and 1 to 2 for adversary and detection 
system respectively, where two 2 × 3 payoff matrixes A and B can be established. 
The problem is to find out the optimized strategy that maximizes the profit for both 
players, namely achieving Nash equilibrium. Measuring the pay off depends on a 
couple of factors, including attack type, density of sensor nodes, and the number of 
previous attacks. Nash equilibrium is achieved when both players selected their own 
first strategy. In other words, protecting the cluster which has the highest value of 
U(t)-Ck brings about a reliable rate of successful detection, where U(t) indicates the 
utility of the network’ s on-going sessions, and Ck indicates the average cost of 
protecting cluster K .  
 
 
4.3. HIERARCHICAL INFRASTRUCTURE and CLUSTER BASED 
ARCHITECTURE BY APPLYING GAME THEORY 
 
Here, we investigate four methods that have employed different game theory 
approaches to enhance the performance of intrusion detection systems in MANET. 
Otrok et al [18] address the problem of increasing the effectiveness of an 
intrusion detection system (IDS) for a cluster of nodes in ad hoc networks. To 
reduce the overhead of IDS, a leader node is usually elected to handle the intrusion 
detection service on behalf of the whole cluster. However, most of current solutions 
elect a leader randomly without considering the resource level of nodes. Such a 
solution will cause that the nodes with less remaining resources to die faster and also 
reducing the overall lifetime of the cluster. It is also vulnerable to selfish nodes that 
do not provide services to others while at the same time benefiting from such 
services. Their experiments show that the presence of selfish nodes can significantly 
reduces the effectiveness of an IDS because fewer packets are inspected over time. 
So, authors have proposed a framework to improve the performance of MANET 
security; their framework has multi goal that we briefly describe them and ways to 
achieve the desire goals as follows:  
a) Increase the overall lifetime of IDS in MANET by truthfully electing the 
most cost-efficient node to handle the detection process on behalf of the 
whole cluster. This is achieved by balancing the resource consumption for 
the detection service among all the nodes in a cluster.  
b) Encourage selfish nodes to truthfully reveal their cost of analysis during a 
leader election. This is achieved by a mechanism designed using the truth-
telling mechanism Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves (VCG) and by binding 
the reputation of a node to the amount of services the node is entitled to. 
Mechanism design is a sub-field of microeconomics and game theory. It 
uses game theory tools to achieve a desired goal. The main difference 
between game theory and mechanism design is that the former is used to 
study what could happen when independent players act selfishly, whereas 
mechanism design allows us to define the game in such a way that the 
outcome of the game, known as the social choice function (SCF) will be 
played by independent players according to the rules set by the 
mechanism designer.  
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c) Catch and punish a misbehaving leader; encourage an elected leader to 
carry out its responsibility of intrusion detection. This is achieved with a 
decentralized catch-and-punish mechanism using random checker nodes. 
Due to un-control problems such as channel collision, the leader-IDS 
could not be able to monitor and analyze the traffic of some protected 
nodes for a specific period of time. Hence, a checker that is monitoring 
the behavior of the leader-IDS could report a misbehaving event and 
therefore the leader-IDS is punished and a new leader is elected.  
d) Reduce the false-positive rate of checkers in catching the misbehaving 
leader. This is achieved by formulating a cooperative decision game 
among the checkers and by a multi-stage catch mechanism.  
e) Increase probability of intrusion detection; maximize the probability of 
detection by optimally distributing the node’s sampling budget among all  
its incoming-links. This is achieved by modeling a zero-sum non-
cooperative game between the leader and intruder with incomplete 
information about the intruder. 
 
Otrok et al.[19]improved security in the framework that was introduced in 
previously. They take into consideration the tradeoff between security and IDS 
resource consumption by a nonzero-sum non cooperative game theoretical model in 
the cluster. Authors considered an IDS in two mode: moderate and robust. In 
moderate mode, cluster leader should provide intrusion detection service to other 
nodes in the same cluster. However, such a moderate mode is only suitable when the 
probability of attack is low. Once the probability of attack is high, victim nodes 
should launch their own IDSs to detect and thwart intrusions that is called robust 
mode. They found the threshold value for notifying the victim node to launch its 
IDS once the probability of attack exceeds that threshold value, thus shift from 
moderate to robust mode. To achieve this goal, the Bayesian game theory is used to 
analyze the interaction between the leader-IDS and intruder with incomplete 
information about the intruder. By solving such a game, the threshold values are 
found. In this game, strategy space of the leader-IDS is moderate, robust and also 
strategy space of the intruder is attack, not attack. The table of game and solution 
have been presented in [19]. 
Kuchaki et al. [20] with combination of game theory approaches proposed an 
optimal solution to attain the security for a cluster of nodes in MANETs. This hybrid 
method has the benefits of previous methods, so that it increases security despite the 
resource efficiency. This optimal method has three phases:  
a) The first phase building trust relationship between nodes and estimation 
trust value for each node to prevent internal intrusion; for achieving this 
goal, they have employed Bayesian game. Therefore, neighboring nodes 
participate in the game and each node observes treat neighbors then 
estimates a trust value for them. If the estimated trust value of a node be 
less than a threshold, then it is detected as a misbehaving node; with this 
way, internal intrusions are prevented. So, if node be malicious or selfish 
then its neighbors estimate low trust value about it and it is denied of the 
network services or is removed.  
b) In the second phase, an optimal mechanism for  holding cluster head 
election is presented. This elected cluster head is ideal, because it is not 
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misbehaving node and it has enough energy resource for intrusions 
detection in its cluster and also has the lowest cost for packet analyzing.  
c)  In the third phase, to detect external intruder, authors employed Bayesian 
game that is proposed by [19] Authors assert that their hybrid method due 
to using game theory, trust value and honest cluster head can effectively 
improve the network security, performance and reduce resource 
consumption. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Intrusion detection based on Game theory is currently attracting considerable 
interest from the research community. So due to vital role of intrusion detection in 
security issue, many various studies were proposed in this area which all of them 
lead to enhance performance of intrusion detection in MANET. In this paper we 
reviewed some game theory approaches where researchers aim that their game 
model considered MANET
,
s features. We  investigated  these game models and their 
goal. 
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